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Thinking, or knowledge getting, is far from being the armchair 
thing it is often supposed to be. The reason it is not an armchair 
thing is that it is not an event going on exclusively within the 
cortex.... Hands and feet, apparatus and appliances of all kinds 
are as much a part of it as changes within the brain. (John 
Dewey 1916, 13-14). 
 
The concept of the extended mind, as introduced by Clark and Chalmers (1998) 
was meant in part to move beyond the standard Cartesian idea that cognition is 
something that happens in a private mental space, “in the head.”  Elsewhere 
(Gallagher 2011; Gallagher and Crisafi 2009), I’ve pursued a liberal interpretation 
of the extended mind, suggesting that we consider cognitive processes as 
constituted in various social practices that occur within social and cultural 
institutions.  This idea of the socially extended mind builds on the enactive idea of 
social affordances.  Just as a notebook or a hand-held piece of technology may be 
viewed as affording a way to enhance or extend our mental possibilities, so the 
use of various institutional procedures and social practices may offer structures 
that support and extend our cognitive abilities.  
 
In this paper I review the arguments that underscore this liberal interpretation and 
some examples that help to make the case.  I also explain why an enactive rather 
than a functionalist approach allows for a better defense against various criticisms 
of the extended mind hypothesis. Finally, I briefly explore some implications of 
the concept of the socially extended mind for social and political thought, 
especially in the context of critical theory.  
 
The parity principle 
 
The parity principle, as defined by Clark and Chalmers (1998) is central to their 
concept of extended mind.   It states: 
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If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a 
process which, were it to go on in the head, we would have no 
hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that 
part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process. 
(Clark and Chalmers 1998, p. 8) 
 
Despite their intention of liberating cognitive processes from a strictly head-
bound, brain-bound set of operations, if the standard, as stated, is whether a 
process could go on ‘in the head’, this remains a relatively conservative principle 
that continues to measure cognition in terms of the traditional conception of the 
mind. This conservative reading suggests that a process outside of the head counts 
as cognitive only if in principle it could be accomplished in the head – 
conforming to the Cartesian concept of mental process as something that would 
normally happen in the head.  Thus, we might think of some mental processes as 
happening “out there” in the world, yet still have a principled reason to limit 
mental processes to the kinds of things that fit a relatively standard model of the 
mind.  
Clark (2008, p. 114), consistent with his functionalist position, rejects this 
interpretation, insisting that the parity principle should not be interpreted as 
requiring any similarity between inner and outer processes (also Wheeler (2006). 
The worry that comes along with this more liberal interpretation is that the 
concept of mind gets overextended to include any process in the world (the 
“cognitive bloat” worry [see Rupert 2004]). Thus, even as he allows for the liberal 
interpretation of the parity principle, Clark starts to tighten it up again with a set 
of additional criteria that need to be met by external physical processes if they are 
to be included as part of an individual’s cognitive process.  He lists three such 
criteria. 
 
1. That the external resource be reliably available and typically 
invoked. 
 
2. That any information thus retrieved be more-or-less 
automatically endorsed. It should not usually be subject to 
critical scrutiny (unlike the opinions of other people, for 
example). It should be deemed about as trustworthy as 
something retrieved clearly from biological memory. 
 
3. That information contained in the resource should be easily 
accessible as and when required. (Clark 2008, 79) 
 
The parity principle plus these criteria rule over Clark and Chalmers’ 
primary and much discussed example of Otto and Inga.  On the one hand Inga (in 
remembering the location of a museum) employs her normal biological memory 
and reflects “… a normal case of belief embedded in memory.”  Otto, on the other 
hand, has a poor memory and “… relies on information in the environment to help 
structure his life. … For Otto, his notebook plays the role usually played by a 
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biological memory” (Clark and Chalmers 1998, 12-13).  Accordingly, Otto’s 
belief about the location of the museum supervenes on devices that lie “beyond 
the skin” when in fact Otto engages with those non-neural devices.  There are 
numerous good examples of how we can enhance our cognitive performance with 
technology – iPhones, GPS, Google, etc. We seemingly are able to store our 
memories, and activate beliefs about where things are located, using such 
instruments. I can’t remember where the restaurant is, but I, plus my technology, 
can.   
One problem with this example is that it frames the discussion with a 
concept of the mind that the extended mind hypothesis is really trying to 
challenge.  It focuses on specific kinds of mental state – belief, or belief 
embedded in memory, plus the desire to find the museum – explicates the three 
criteria that seem to apply to such mental states, and then generalizes the criteria 
to apply to all cognitive processes.   The controlling conception of the mind that 
guides this analysis, then, is that the mind is constituted by beliefs, desires, and 
other propositional attitudes, and for Clark and other extended mind theorists 
(e.g., Clark 2008; Rowlands 2009), by representations and informational states as 
well.  But neither the standard belief-desire psychology nor these criteria 
necessarily apply to all cognition, especially if one thinks of cognition in terms of 
enactive cognitive processes and activities, e.g., problem solving, interpreting, 
judging, rather than in terms of mental states or contents.   
Accordingly, these criteria seem not just too conservative, but wrong-
headed. Each of them, for example, involves matters of degree.  It seems possible 
that some instrument that allows me to think through a problem, and without 
which I would not be able to think through the problem (see, e.g., the example of 
the legal system developed below), is neither as reliably available (1), nor as 
easily accessible (3), as my notebook.  Should that automatically exclude it as part 
of my cognitive process if it subvenes my effective cognitive solution? Moreover, 
certain institutional or collective practices that subvene my cognitive performance 
may introduce greater stability than is available in a single biological system. 
 The second criterion, concerning automatic endorsement and a lack of 
critical scrutiny, is also suspect.  But why should some process that would 
otherwise count as a cognitive process not count as a cognitive process because it 
requires critical scrutiny, which is itself a cognitive process?  Taking a critical 
metacognitive perspective on a problem-solving act of cognition, is a frequent 
(and often a much encouraged) cognitive process. Such critical processes, 
moreover, may sometimes necessitate a certain institutional or collective 
arrangement.  That is, some critical perspectives clearly involve processes that 
supervene on a social institution, and may do so in a way that is even more 
trustworthy or reliable, than biological memory. 
The violation of these criteria, and any lack of parity with internal mental 
states, should not disqualify such processes from being considered cognitive if 
they are processes to which the human organism is linked in the right way, that is, 
“in a two-way interaction, creating a coupled system that can be seen as a 
cognitive system in its own right” (Clark and Chalmers 1998, p. 8).   
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Mental institutions 
In contrast to the constrictive effect of these criteria, I argue for a liberal, and 
specifically social extension of the extended mind hypothesis.  I appeal to certain 
social practices and institutions that are what we might call ‘mental institutions’ 
(Gallagher and Crisafi 2009), in the sense that they are not only institutions with 
which we accomplish certain cognitive processes, but also without which such 
cognitive processes would no longer exist.  They are at least enabling conditions, 
and on the most liberal reading, constitutive of those processes.1  Examples 
include things like legal systems, research practices, and cultural institutions.  In 
each case a mental institution 
  
1. includes cognitive practices that are produced in specific times and 
places, and  
2. is activated in ways that extend our cognitive processes when we 
engage with them (that is, when we interact with, or are coupled to 
them in the right way).  
 
I’ve suggested that the legal system is a good example (Gallagher 2011; 
Gallagher and Crisafi 2009).  Consider, for example, a contract or legal agreement 
which is in some real sense an expression of several minds externalized and 
extended into the world, instantiating in external memory an agreed-upon 
decision, adding to a system of rights and laws that transcend the particularities of 
any individual’s mind.  Contracts are institutions that embody conceptual schemas 
that, in turn, contribute to and shape our cognitive processes.  They are not only 
the product of certain cognitive exercises, but are also used as tools to accomplish 
certain aims, to reinforce certain behaviors, and to solve certain problems.  
Institutions of property, contract, rights, and law not only guide our thinking 
about social arrangements, for example, or about what we can and cannot do, but 
allow us to think in ways that were not possible without such institutions.  Insofar 
as we cognitively engage with such tools and institutions we extend and transform 
our cognitive processes. 
The legal system is constructed in part in these cognitive processes.  Legal 
practices, the formation of legal judgments, the administration of justice, the 
application of law to particular cases, are, among other things (such as exercises 
of power) cognitive.  They do not, however, happen simply in the individual 
brains of judge, jury, defense attorney, prosecutor, etc.  Of course we usually 
think of judgments as happening in the privacy of one’s own head. But some 
judgments supervene on extra-neural practices and processes that guide them or 
that allow manipulation of a large amount of empirical information.  In a court of 
law, for example, testimony is produced according to rules of evidence, and 
judgments are made following a set of rules that are established by the system. 
The process in which the judgments get made will depend on a number of people 
remaining cognitively engaged with a body of law, the relevant parts of which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  See	  De	  Jaegher,	  Di	  Paolo,	  and	  Gallagher	  (2010)	  for	  the	  distinction	  between	  ‘contextual	  factor’,	  ‘enabling	  condition’,	  and	  ‘constitutive	  process’.	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come to the fore because of the precise particulars of the case, as the proceedings 
develop.  
Consider an example that involves three different scenarios (see Crisafi and 
Gallagher 2010).  Alexis is given a set of facts and is presented a collection of 
evidence and is asked to judge the legitimacy of a certain claim that is being 
made.   
     
(1) In the first scenario she is asked to make her judgment on the basis of her 
own subjective sense of fairness, weighing the evidence entirely in her 
own head. 
(2) In the second scenario experts specify the kind of questions or 
considerations she can address. 
(3) In the third scenario experts further provide possible answers and a set of 
rules to follow in making her decision.  
 
In the first scenario Alexis seemingly does all of the work in her own head. In the 
second, there may be less cognitive effort on her part since she did not have to 
draw up the questions, and the possible answers were already provided.  Yet, it’s 
clear that cognition is socially extended across the legal institutional practices in 
all the scenarios, since even in (1) Alexis is presented the evidence and given a 
predetermined task. She doesn’t think these up on her own.  In none of these cases 
can Alexis’ thinking be reduced to purely ‘in the head’ processes.  The cognition 
involved is distributed.  There is a distribution across a number of participants – 
including the experts, where the distribution is different in each scenario.  In (3) 
we might think that there is not only less cognitive effort going on in Alexis’ head 
-- she not only doesn’t have to draw up the questions and possible answers, she 
doesn’t have to produce the principles or rules required to make the judgment.  
There may be less cognitive effort going on in the heads of the experts too, since 
what they provide to Alexis (answer types and rules) may be pre-established in 
the legal system, instituted by previous practice.  Indeed, we could say that such 
questions, possible answers, and rules create the tracks along which the cognitive 
processes must run to keep it, literally, legitimate. The answer types and rules are 
part of a system – stored in a system – a system previously established in 
cognitive processes, and maintained in textual, technological, institutional 
procedures or cultural practices.  The relevant elements of the system were 
previously established in processes that we would certainly call cognitive, and 
likely depend on a more wide-ranging set of (cognitive) justifications.   When 
individuals like Alexis and the experts become engaged with the system in the 
right way, the system does some of the cognitive work.  
Judgments, then, are not necessarily confined to individual brains, or even 
to the many brains that constitute a particular court.  They emerge in the workings 
of a large and complex institution. Yet these judgments and legal proceedings are 
cognitive processes that then contribute to the continued working of the system in 
the form of precedents. The practice of law, which is constituted by just such 
cognitive and communicative processes, is carried out via the cooperation of 
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many people relying on external (and conventional) cognitive schemas and rules 
of evidence provided by the legal institution itself.   
Judgments made in such contexts, and the specific kind of judgments that 
are made, are forms of cognition that supervene on a large and complex system 
without which they could not happen. Indeed, these cognitive practices are such 
that in principle they could not happen just in the head.  Even in the case of a 
highly trained attorney who seemingly does what she does in her head, what she 
does, and what makes it the kind of cognition that it is, depends not only on the 
fact that she has previously engaged in the workings of the legal system 
(receiving her training and tuning her cognitive abilities in law school by 
following specific practices of that educational institution), but on the ongoing 
workings of the legal system since what she engages in, i.e., the particular 
cognitive process of forming a legal judgment, is what it is only in that system. 
It’s not difficult to imagine a specific kind of question that would never even 
come up if there were no legal system.  The legal system in effect helps to 
generate certain cognitive events, sometimes creating perplexities and problems 
of a purely legal nature, and sometimes helping to resolve them. An individual 
required to make judgments about the legitimacy of certain arrangements thus 
interacts with the legal institution and forms a coupled system in a way that 
allows new cognitive processes to emerge – cognitive processes that would 
otherwise not be possible.  Take away the external part of this cognitive process – 
take away the legal institution – and “the system's behavioural competence will 
drop, just as it would if we removed part of its brain” (Clark and Chalmers 1998, 
p. 9). 
If we think of the mind not as a repository of propositional attitudes and 
information, or in terms of internal belief-desire psychology, but as a dynamic 
process involved in solving problems and controlling behavior and action – in 
dialectical, transformative relations with the environment – then we extend our 
cognitive reach by engaging with tools, technologies, but also with institutions.  
We create these institutions via our own (shared) mental processes, or we inherit 
them as products constituted in mental processes already accomplished by others.  
We then engage with these institutions – and in doing so, participate with others – 
to do further cognitive work.  These socially established institutions sometimes 
constitute, sometimes facilitate, and sometimes impede, but in each case enable 
and shape our cognitive interactions with other people.  
Such institutions allow us to engage in cognitive activities that we are 
unable to do purely in the head, or even in many heads.  If we are justified in 
saying that working with a notebook or a calculator is mind-extending, it seems 
equally right to say that working with the law, the use of the legal system in the 
practice of legal argumentation, deliberation and judgment, as well as the 
cognitive processes involved in the enforcement of law for purposes of 
controlling behavior are mind-extending too.  This view pushes us beyond the 
strictly defined parity principle and challenges the conservative criteria endorsed 
by Clark and his colleagues.  It also suggests that cognition doesn’t simply extend 
from the brain outward to incorporate tools, technologies, and institutions, but that 
it sometimes works from the outside in; tools, technologies and institutions often 
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shape our cognitive processes, make our brains work in certain ways, and may 
even elicit plastic changes in neuronal structure. 
 
Following directions 
 
This way of thinking about mental institutions motivates a significant 
research agenda, so that from here we could move in a number of directions. One 
set of questions that needs to be explored is how the idea of the socially extended 
mind relates to issues of development and social cognition. In this regard one 
might start with the idea that the family is ontogenetically the first institution, and 
ask how basic embodied and situated processes of primary and secondary 
intersubjectivity pull the infant into cognitive habits that shape all further 
learning, and that become linguistic (and narrative) practices that are further 
educated in all other social institutions encountered by the child (Gallagher and 
Hutto 2007).   
One could further explore how participatory sense making (De Jaegher 
and Di Paolo 2007) works within specific institutions.  As enactive approaches to 
cognition have suggested, sense-making processes involve a form of social 
interaction that has a certain autonomy; that is, such interactive processes are not 
necessarily under an individual agent’s complete control, but often transcend the 
agent’s subjective processes (De Jaegher, Di Paolo, and Gallagher 2010).  Social 
interaction and participatory sense making specifically involve patterns of 
engagement that can acquire their own form of self-organisation.  In the context 
of extended cognition, where we can speak of interaction with institutions as well 
as with tools, instruments, technologies, etc., the point is that cognition just is any 
interaction or engagement that produces meaning for the agent, where the 
production of meaning is not just an individual enterprise.  Participatory sense 
making is always shaped by super-individual norms and institutional practices. 
A third direction is almost too obvious to mention. One could investigate 
the different ways that particular kinds of institutions extend cognition.  I’ve 
argued that the use of a legal system to solve a legal problem constitutes a case of 
complex “epistemic action,” and is an instance of extended cognition. The legal 
system, however, is just one example and we have only scratched the surface in 
our conceptual analysis of it as a mental institution.  Clearly we could expand on 
this by taking into consideration empirical studies that show precisely how 
cognition is shaped by various practices found, not only in the legal system, but in 
various institutions – including educational, cultural, entertainment, military, 
corporate, religious, scientific, and so forth.  Consider, for example, the cognitive 
work involved in scientific research – would such work be possible – or would it 
be what it is – without the kinds of things and institutions that make it happen?  
This may include labs, scientific practices and procedures, journals and 
publication practices, funding agencies – all of which carry scientific thinking 
along and make science what it is. 
In the remainder of this paper I want to pursue two other directions.  First, 
I want to take the discussion of the socially extended mind back to the ongoing 
extended mind debates between Clark, Wheeler, Rowlands, et al. on one side, and 
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Adams, Aizawa, Rupert, et al. on the other side.  In this regard I want to suggest 
that an enactive approach to the various facets of this debate can offer a better 
defense of the extended mind hypothesis from objections that involve cognitive 
bloat, the so called causal coupling-constitution fallacy, and the mark of the 
mental. Second, I want to take the concept of the socially extended mind forward 
into contexts that involve questions about social critique and institutional change.  
In this regard I will suggest that the idea of the socially extended mind can 
provide a useful tool for critical theory. 
 
Some ongoing debates about the extended mind 
 
It certainly seems that if critics are worried about the relatively conservative 
conception of the extended mind defended by Clark and Chalmers (1998), they 
may be even more worried about what is seemingly a “larger” and more liberal 
socially extended concept of the mind.  I want to consider what seem to me to be 
the three main objections to the extended mind raised by its critics.  
 
The causal coupling-constitution fallacy 
Even if externalities play a role in cognition, according to Adams and Aizawa 
(2009), they play only a contextual, enabling or causal role rather than a 
constitutive role.  On their internalist concept of the mind, all of the real 
constituting action of cognition happens in the brain, even if it is in some way 
supported or facilitated by external elements.  Some factors are clearly causal; the 
air we breath, for example, is necessary for cognition to take place, but neither the 
air nor our respiration is a constitutive part of cognition.  More generally the fact 
that something is causally coupled to our cognitive system does not make it part 
of the cognitive system (Adams and Aizawa 2010).  
Clearly Adams and Aizawa are correct to suggest that some factors are causal 
and not constitutive.  For example, in a recent study of judicial decisions Dansiger 
et al. (2011) have shown that the rational application of legal reasons does not 
sufficiently explain the decisions of judges. Whether the judge is hungry or 
satiated may play an important role.  Their study showed that the “percentage of 
favorable rulings drops gradually from ≈65% to nearly zero within each decision 
session [e.g., between breakfast and lunch] and returns abruptly to ≈65% after a 
[food] break.”  This suggests that “judicial rulings can be swayed by extraneous 
variables that should have no bearing on legal decisions.” (Dansiger et al. 2011, 
1).  Some embodied theorists might object to such factors being called 
‘extraneous’ to the cognitive process, but they are surely extraneous to the extent 
that they are not included in the normative factors and arrangements that 
constitute the legal judgment.  The state of the judge’s stomach may be a causal 
factor in her judgment, but the rules of evidence and the specific legal practices 
that have been followed in the hearing – the mental institutions – are in fact 
constitutive: they make the judgment the legal judgment that it is. The idea that x 
is a causal factor assumes we are capable of thinking in a certain way 
independently of x, and given some alternative set of causal factors. Starving the 
judge or bringing him a sandwich (highly recommended if you are being 
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sentenced) will not guarantee that the judgment will go one way or another.  The 
idea that x is a constitutive factor, however, suggests that it may not be possible to 
think that way without x.  Take away rules of evidence or some set of legal 
practices and the judgment ceases to be the judicial thing that it needs to be. 
 Another example may help to clarify this.  Consider what we might call a 
case of manipulated thinking, i.e., our decision making process is manipulated by 
certain corporate or institutional practices.  Paul Slovic’s research on altruism 
provides a benign example. Slovic’s group has studied empathy and altruistic 
behavior and has shown that the kind of information provided to potential 
charitable donors will affect not only their decision to act altruistically by making 
a donation, but will determine the amount that they donate.  It’s known, for 
example, that a higher number of victims involved in a major disaster or in 
genocide will not necessarily generate more altruistic behavior than a smaller 
number (Figure 1).  
 
 
A       B 
 
 
Figure	   1:	   Graph	   A	   represents	   a	   normative	   utilitarian	  model	   that	   suggests	   that	   the	  
larger	   loss	   of	   life	   will	   motivate	   a	   greater	   degree	   of	   altruism.	   	   Graph	   B	   represents	  
something	  closer	  to	  actual	  behavior.	   	  The	  greater	  the	   loss	  of	   life	  the	  more	  abstract	  
and	  emotion-­‐less	  it	  becomes	  with	  only	  slight	  increases	  in	  altruistic	  behavior	  after	  the	  
first	  few	  cases.	  	  (Figures	  from	  Slovic	  2007).	  
	  
When someone is presented with a set of statistics, the cold although convincing 
facts about the enormity of the problem to be addressed, they show less altruistic 
behavior (make less donations) than when they are presented with the image and 
or personal story of one individual.  Alternatively, when presented with the 
personal details concerning the suffering of another individual person, people 
experience a variety of emotional reactions and show a higher degree of altruistic 
behavior (Figure 2). Thus, when information about others is presented in a way 
that elicits empathic responses, donations are greater in comparison to when this 
information is processed in a detached, abstract, or intangible way (Dickert & 
Slovic 2009). Charitable organizations capitalize on this fact to secure donations 
for humanitarian aid purposes (Small, Loewenstein & Slovic 2007).  
 
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 2, No. 2, April 2007 Psychic numbing and genocide 84
Table 2. Two modes of thinking: Comparison of experiential and analytic systems (adapted from Epstein, 1994,
Copyright 1991, with permission from Guilford).
System 1: Experiential System System 2: Analytic System
Affective: pleasure-pain oriented Logical: reason oriented (what is sensible)
Connections by association Connections by logical assessment
Behavior mediated by feelings from past experiences Behavior mediated by conscious appraisal of events
Encodes reality in images, metaphors, and narratives Encodes reality in abstract symbols, words, and numbers
More rapid processing: oriented toward immediate action Slower processing: oriented toward delayed action
Self-evidently valid: “experiencing is believing” Requires justification via logic and evidence
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Figure 3: Another normative model: Large losses
threaten the viability of the group or society (as with
genocide).
4.1 The psychophysical model
Affect is a remarkable mechanism that enabled humans
to survive the long course of evolution. Before there
were sophisticated analytic tools such as probability the-
ory, scientific risk assessment, and cost/benefit calculus,
humans used their senses, honed by experience, to deter-
mine whether the animal lurking in the bushes was safe
to approach or the murky water in the pond was safe to
drink. Simply put, System 1 thinking evolved to protect
individuals and their small family and community groups
from present, visible, immediate dangers. This affective
system did not evolve to help us respond to distant, mass
murder. As a result, System 1 thinking responds to large-
scale atrocities in ways that are less than desirable.
Fundamental qualities of human behavior are, of
course, recognized by others besides scientists. Ameri-
can writer Annie Dillard, cl verly demon trates the limi-
tation of our affective system as she seeks to help us un-
derstand the humanity of the Chinese nation: “There are
1,198,500,000 people alive now in China. To get a feel for
what this means, simply take yourself — in all your sin-
gularity, importance, complexity, and love — and multi-
ply by 1,198,500,000. See? Nothing to it” (Dillard, 1999,
p. 47, italics added).
We quickly recognize that Dillard is joking when she
asserts “nothing to it.” We know, as she does, that we
are incapable of feeling the humanity behind the number
1,198,500,000. The circuitry in our brain is not up to
this task. This same incapacity is echoed by Nobel prize
winning biochemist Albert Szent Gyorgi as he struggles
to comprehend the possible consequences of nuclear war:
“I am deeply moved if I see one man suffering and would
risk my life for him. Then I talk impersonally about the
possible pulverization of our big cities, with a hundred
million dead. I am unable to multiply one man’s suffering
by a hundred million.”
There is considerable evidence that our affective re-
sponses and the resulting value we place on saving uman
lives may follow the same sort of “psychophysical func-
tion” that characterizes our diminished sensitivity to a
wide range of perceptual and cognitive entities — bright-
ness, loudness, heaviness, and money — as their under-
lying magnitudes increase.
What psychological principles lie behind this insensi-
tivity? In the 19th century, E. H. Weber and Gustav Fech-
ner discovered a fundamental psychophysical principle
that describes how we perceive changes in our environ-
ment. They found that people’s ability to detect changes
in a physical stimulus rapidly decreases as the magnitude
of the stimulus increases (Weber, 1834; Fechner, 1860).
What is known today as “Weber’s law” states that in or-
der for a change in a stimulus to become just noticeable,
a fixed percentage must be a ded. Thus, perceived differ-
ence is a relative matter. To a small stimulus, only a small
amount must be added to be noticeable. To a large stim-
ulus, a large amount must be added. Fechner proposed a
logarithmic law to model this nonlinear growth of sensa-
tion. Nume ous empir cal studies by S. S. Stevens (1975)
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have demonstrated that the growth of sensory magnitude
(⇥) is best fit by a power function of the stimulus magni-
tude  , ⇥ =    , where the exponent   is typically less
than one for measurements of phenomena such as loud-
ness, brightness, and even the value of money (Galanter,
1962). For example, if the exponent is 0.5 as it is in some
studies of perceived brightness, a light that is four times
the intensity of another light will be judged only twice as
bright.
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Figure 4: A psychophysical model describing how the
saving of human lives may actually be valued.
Our cognitive and perceptual systems seem to be de-
signed to sensitize us to small changes in our nviron-
ment, possibly at the expense of making us less able to
detect and respond to large c ange . As the psychophys-
ical res arch indicat s, constant increas s in the m ni-
tude of a stimulus typically evoke smaller and smaller
changes in response. Applying this principle to the valu-
ing of human life suggests that form of psychophys-
ical numbing may result from our inability to appreci-
ate losses of life as they become larger (see Figure 4).
The function in Figure 4 represents a value structure in
which the importance of saving one life is great when it
is the first, or only, life saved, but diminishes marginally
as the total number of lives saved increases. Thus, psy-
chologically, the importance of saving one life is dimin-
ished against the background of a larger threat — we will
likely not “feel” much different, nor value the difference,
between saving 87 lives and saving 88, if these prospects
are presented to us separately.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) have incorporated this
psychophysical principle of decreasing sensitivity into
prospect theory, a descriptive account of decision making
under uncertainty. A major element of prospect theory is
the value function, which relates subjective value to ac-
tual gains or losses. When applied to human lives, the
value function implies that the subjective value of saving
a specific number of lives is greater for a smaller tragedy
than for a larger one.
Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, Johnson, and Friedrich
(1997) documented this potential for diminished sensitiv-
ity to the value of life — i.e., “psychophysical numbing”
— by evaluating people’s willingness to fund various life-
saving medical treatments. In a study involving a hy-
pothetical grant funding agency, respondents were asked
to indicate the number of lives a medical research insti-
tute would have to save to merit receipt of a $10 million
grant. Nearly two-thirds of the respondents raised their
minimum benefit requirements to warrant funding when
there was a larger at-risk population, with a median value
of 9,000 lives needing to be saved when 15,000 were at
risk, compared to a median of 100,000 lives needing to
be saved out of 290,000 at risk. By implication, respon-
dents saw saving 9,000 lives in the “smaller” population
as more valuable than saving ten times as many lives in
the largest.
Several other studies in the domain of life-saving inter-
ventions have documented similar psychophysical numb-
ing or proportional reasoning effects (Baron, 1997; Bar-
tels & Burnett, 2006; Fetherstonhaugh et al., 1997;
Friedrich et al., 1999; Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997; Ubel
et al., 2001). For example, Fetherstonhaugh et al. (1997)
also found that people were less willing to send aid that
would save 1500 lives in Rwandan refugee camps as the
size of the camps’ at-risk population increased. Friedrich
et al. (1999) found that people required more lives to be
saved to justify mandatory antilock brakes on new cars
when the alleged size of the at-risk pool (annual braking-
related deaths) increased.
These diverse strategies of lifesaving demonstrate that
the proportion of lives saved often carries more weight
than the number of lives saved when people evaluate in-
terventions. Thus, extrapolating from Fetherstonhaugh et
al., one would expect that, in separate evaluations, there
would be more support for saving 80% of 100 lives at risk
than for saving 20% of 1,000 lives at risk. This is consis-
tent with an affective (System 1) account, in which the
number of lives saved conveys little affect but the propor-
tion saved carries much feeling: 80% is clearly “good”
and 20% is “poor.”
Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor (2004),
drawing upon the finding that proportions appear to con-
vey more feeling than do numbers of lives, predicted (and
found) that college students, in a between-groups design,
would more strongly support an airport-safety measure
expected to save 98% of 150 lives at risk than a measure
expected to save 150 lives. Saving 150 lives is diffusely
good, and therefore somewhat hard to evaluate, whereas
saving 98% of something is clearly very good because it
is so close to the upper bound on the percentage scale, and
hence is highly weighted in the support judgment. Subse-
quent reduction of the percentage of 150 lives that would
be saved to 95%, 90%, and 85% led to reduced support
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 Figure	  2:	  Mean	  donation	   in	   cases	  when	   subjects	  were	   told	   that	   donations	  would	  help	  support	  a	  particular	  individual	  vs.	  when	  subjects	  were	  told	  that	  donations	  would	  support	  relief	  efforts	  addressing	  problems	  summarized	  by	  a	  set	  of	  statistics,	  vs.	  when	  they	  were	  presented	  with	  both	  the	  statistics	  and	  the	  individual	  case.	  (From	  Slovic	  2007).	  
 
This kind of presentational practice (sometimes benign, sometimes not) may 
play a causal role shaping the way people decide to donate (in the same way a 
priming effect may cause a certain behavior or way of thinking). But if a charity 
organization adopts this practice in presenting its solicitations, then this instituted 
practice may help to constitute the way its members or management staff think or 
decide to do things, may constitute the very way that they think about solving 
problems – or in Clark’s preferred phrase, this practice enters into the agent’s 
cognitive system.  Clearly, then, some externalities – institutional practices and 
policies – may play a constitutional role in making cognition what it is. 
 
Cognitive bloat 
The inclusion of mental institutions in the notion of extended mind seems 
to be a good example of the cognitive bloat that Rupert (2004) worries about, 
where cognition extends to all kinds of processes that seem at odds with the very 
notion (or the very traditional notion) of cognition.  If my mind is extended by my 
use of Google to solve a problem, does that mean that cognitive processing is 
ongoing everywhere in cyberspace?  Rowlands (2009), in response to the 
cognitive bloat argument, has suggested that part of what qualifies a process as 
cognitive is that it is owned by the agent.  This notion of ownership, however, 
doesn’t seem to apply to mental institutions – no one owns the legal system, for 
example.  Here, however, we might appeal to a Lockean notion of ownership: 
ownership is constituted by the work invested.  More precisely, it is the fact that I 
am working and engaged in the right way with mental institutions that makes 
them a constituent part of my cognitive processes.  Only so far as I am properly 
engaged with these institutions (or with notebooks or pieces of technology), do 
they contribute to the constitution of my cognitive processes.  If I am not engaged 
with them (just as some neuronal processes in my brain may remain unactivated 
in specific circumstances) then they are not cognitively activated.  Rupert’s (2009, 
131) notion of “densely interactive processes” – “those in which the organism and 
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Statistical lives
• Food shortages in Malawi are affecting more than 3 million children.
• In Zambia, severe rainfall deficits have resulted in a 42% drop in maize production from 2000. As a
result, an estimated 3 million Zambians face hunger.
• Four million Angolans — one third of the population — have been forced to flee their homes.
• More than 11 million people in Ethiopia need immediate food assistance.
Identifiable lives
Rokia, a 7-year-old girl from Mali, Africa, is desperately poor and faces a
threat of severe hunger or even starvation. Her life will be changed for the
better as a result of your financial gift. With your support, and the support of
other caring sponsors, Save the Children will work with Rokia’s family and
other members of the community to help feed her, provide her with education,
as well as basic medical care and hygiene education.
Figure 7: Donating money to save statistical and identified lives. Reprinted from Small et al. (2007). Copyright (2007),
with permission from Elsevier. (Photograph has been altered.)
6 The collapse of compassion
Vivid images of recent natural disasters in South Asia and
the American Gulf Coast, and stories of individual vic-
tims, brought to us through relentless, courageous, and
intimate news coverage, certainly unleashed a tidal wave
of compassion and humanitarian aid from all over the
world. Private donations to the victims of the Decem-
ber 2004 tsunami exceeded $1 billion. Charities such as
Save the Children have long recognized that it is better
to endow a donor with a single, named child to support
than to ask for contributions to the bigger cause. Perhaps
there is hope that vivid, personalized media coverage of
genocide could motivate intervention.
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Figure 8: Mean donations. Reprinted from Small et al.
(2007), Copyright (2007), with permission from Elsevier.
Perhaps. But again we should look to research to assess
these possibilities. Numerous experiments have demon-
strated the “identifiable victim effect” which is also so ev-
ident outside the laboratory. People are much more will-
ing to aid identified individuals than unidentified or sta-
tistical victims (Kogut & Ritov, 2005a; Schelling, 1968;
Small & Loewenstein 2003, 2005; Jenni & Loewenstein,
1997). Small, Loewenstein, and Slovic (2007) gave peo-
ple leaving a psychological experiment the opportunity to
contribute up to $5 of their earnings to Save the Children.
The study consisted of three separate conditions: (1)
identifiable victim, (2) statistical victims, and (3) identifi-
able victim with statistical information. The information
provided for the identifiable and statistical conditions is
shown in Figure 7. Participants in each condition were
told that “any money donated will go toward relieving
the severe food crisis in Southern Africa and Ethiopia.”
The donations in fact went to Save the Children, but they
were earmarked specifically for Rokia in Conditions 1
and 3 and not specifically earmarked in Condition 2. The
average donations are presented in Figure 8. Donations
in response to the identified individual, Rokia, were far
greater than donations in response to the statistical por-
trayal of the food crisis. Most important, however, and
most discouraging, was the fact that coupling the statis-
tical realities with Rokia’s story significantly reduced the
contributions to Rokia. Alternatively, one could say that
using Rokia’s story to “put a face behind the statistical
problem” did not do much to increase donations (the dif-
ference between the mean donations of $1.43 and $1.14
was not statistically reliable).
Small et al. also measured feelings of sympathy toward
the cause (Rokia or the statistical victims). These feelings
were most strongly correlated with donations when peo-
ple faced an identifiable victim.
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environment affect each other in an ongoing way,” which we might call enactive 
couplings involving both neural and non-neural factors -- expand the defining 
limit for the concept of cognition. What constitutes the cognitive is tied to the 
specific kind of engagement that’s involved.  
The “specific kind” of enactive couplings includes my engagement with 
social customs and practices.  In solving a problem like keeping my cattle in my 
pasture, my bodily manipulations of a set of wooden poles and wire are not part of 
the cognitive process; but my engagement with the particular local 
custom/practice of solving this problem with a fence (and even a specific kind of 
fence) is a cognitive part of the problem solving.  If there were no local custom in 
this regard, the cognitive processes required to solve the problem would be more 
narrowly “in the head.”  In each case, cultural practices, local know-how in the 
form of established practices, etc., in either formal or informal ways, enter into 
and shape the thinking process.  Without such cultural practices, rules, norms, etc. 
the thinking – our cognitive processes – would be different.  
It’s important to be clear about what is claimed in the extended mind 
hypothesis.  It’s easy to confuse the issue.  Larry Shapiro (2009), for example, in 
his review of Adams and Aizawa (2008), offers the following example. 
 
When I dig a hole, the shovel aids me in this task, and it may even 
be true that I could not dig the hole without the shovel. But this 
does not extend my musculature into [things that are] independent 
of my musculature. According to Adams and Aizawa the same story 
holds true, mutatis mutandis, for cognition and its external 
accessories. 
 
Clearly the claim should not be that I extend my musculature – the point would 
rather be that the digging is something extended from my bodily musculature 
across the shovel and into the ground. Take away the musculature, or the shovel, 
or the ground, and nothing like digging would be going on.  Likewise, no one 
claims that I extend my brain by using a notepad, or by engaging with an 
institutional practice, but rather that I extend the cognitive process. Yet, as we 
know from neuroscience, such extensions may transform our brain; there are, for 
example, plastic remappings of somatosensory cortex for ego‐centric coding of 
arm position when we use tools (Bassolino et al. 2009); and there are the famous 
studies of the enlarged hippocampi of London taxi drivers (Mcguire et al. 2000). 
Such changes are relevant if, as one may presume, taxi drivers enactively use 
streets and landmarks in the surrounding city to orient and find their way, and not 
simply some internalized map.  It seems likely that in the future hippocampi of 
taxi drivers may shrink as they transition to full use of GPS technology, and likely 
other parts of the brain may change to support this use.  If prolonged cognitive 
practices in an urban transportation system can change one’s brain, then it is not 
unlikely that prolonged cognitive practices in a legal system could do the same for 
attorneys, judges, etc.  Such plastic changes in the neural elements of cognition 
may be evidence that the right kind of coupling has been established.  Unlike the 
parity principle, however, it’s not a matter of functional equivalence: e.g., one can 
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have either a large hippocampus or a GPS doing the same work.  Rather, 
cognition is in the dynamic coupling of neural and non-neural processes that make 
cognition what it is.  The point here is that as we engage with externalities in 
specific ways our cognitive processes – including our neural processes, but not 
just our neural processes – are transformed.  
 
The mark of the mental 
Adams and Aizawa (2008) develop a further objection to the extended mind 
hypothesis, contending that where cognition stops and something non-cognitive 
begins can be determined by “the mark of the mental,” and that external processes 
do not have this mark.  The more positive outcome of their first causal coupling-
constitution objection is their proposal for a specific mark of the mental.   
 
If the fact that an object or process X is coupled to a cognitive agent 
does not entail that X is part of the cognitive agent’s cognitive 
apparatus, what does?  The nature of X, of course.  One needs a 
theory of what makes a process a cognitive process…..  One needs a 
theory of the “mark of the cognitive” (Adams and Aizawa 2010, p. 
68). 
  
Their preferred internalist theory is that the mark of the cognitive is “non-derived 
content” – the kind of representations generated in neural processing. Intrinsic 
‘cognitive states in normal cognitive agents do not derive their meanings from 
conventions or social practices … Whatever is responsible for non-derived 
representations seems to find a place only in brains’ (2001, 48, 63).  But the 
concept of non-derived content is not on settled ground.  As Shapiro (2009) notes, 
“there is today no received theory of how original content comes to be in the first 
place.”  Accordingly, it might be possible to find a theory of non-derived content 
that is consistent with extended cognition – and one would need to leave that 
option open, or start begging the question.  The latter happens quite easily when 
one defines the nature of content in terms of the kind of vehicles that can carry it. 
Others have appealed to intentionality (following Brentano’s idea) as the correct 
mark (e.g., Menary 2009).  Again, however, there is a good deal of disagreement 
about intentionality.  Surely, for example, the experience of pain is a mental 
experience, but is it intentional?  (see, e.g., Crane 1998 for discussion).  Some, 
including Husserl and Searle, have argued that not all mental experience is 
intentional.  Furthermore, the problem this solution is meant to solve is simply 
repeated again if, as some claim, intentionality is purely internalistic (see, e.g., 
Horgan and Tienson 2002), while others claim, alternatively, that non-derived 
intentionality is actually the kind of embodied, enactive, and socially constituted 
phenomenon found in the phenomenological or neo-pragmatic concept of motor 
or operative intentionality (Gallagher and Miyahara, in press). 
Such considerations should be set aside because the question about the 
mark of the mental is just not the right question, whatever the right answer might 
be to it. Within the terms of this particular debate, the concept is too closely tied 
to the traditional conception of the mind that is being challenged by the extended 
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mind hypothesis.  To accept the terms of the debate is to already concede too 
much.  One can see this in the fact that the debate about the mark of the mental is 
often framed in terms of the content-vehicle distinction, a distinction that has an 
important clarifying function when we think of the mind on an orthodox 
representational or functionalist model, but one that should be abandoned on an 
enactive conception of the extended mind. On the more enactive view, we need to 
conceive of the mind/brain, not as the place where all the mental processing and 
representing happens, but as part of a larger, embodied and enactive system.  
Cognition is not about content (whether non-derived or derived) being carried by 
vehicles (whether neural or extra-neural), but is an enactive and emotionally 
embedded engagement with the world through which we solve problems, control 
behavior, understand, judge, explain, and generally do certain kinds of things – 
much of that constitutionally shaped by tools, environmental factors, social 
practices, etc. On this conception, the mind is constituted primarily by just such 
activities, whereas propositional attitudes, mental states, representations, and any 
talk of vehicles or contents (whether derived or non-derived) are derivative and 
are inexplicable except in reference to such activities.  
 
Socially extended mind and critical theory 
The idea of the socially extended mind motivates a critical normative 
perspective not usually taken up in the cognitive science literature on the extended 
mind. Cognitive processes, as they are shaped in both institutional and 
technological structures and practices, can allow us to see certain possibilities 
even as they blind us to others.  We should take a closer and critical look at how 
social and cultural practices either productively extend or, in some cases, curtail 
mental processes.  We know that certain technologies and media, as they are 
strategically used for consciously determined objectives by various institutions for 
various reasons, offer possibilities, which at the same time carry our cognitive 
processes in specific directions.  Such processes can have profound effects on us, 
and on our thinking. It is therefore important to ask what such mechanisms or 
practices or institutions do to us as agents and as subjects of cognition.  I think 
that these kinds of questions fall squarely into the concerns of critical social 
theory.  
At least on one critical theory approach, inspired by Habermas, the main 
task would be to expose the various epistemic actions and operations carried out 
by cognitive agents operating in frameworks established by institutional practices 
that distort (or at least shape) our cognitive processes, in order to promote ethical 
or political reflection on such practices.  Of course any critical theory worth its 
salt would then turn its critical reflective eye on the way we carry out such ethical 
and political (and perhaps inevitably ideologically informed) reflections to further 
inquire about the instituted practices of such reflections.  If this task is to be met 
by critical theory, then it needs to enlist the help of, or perhaps itself to become a 
kind of critical cognitive science (Chodery and Slaby 2011).   
Consider, for example, that cognitive studies of decision making show that 
even if one seems to be engaged in a solitary set of mental reflections in one’s 
head, decision making is really a matter of embodied, emotion-rich, 
	   14	  
environmentally modulated processes.  Even if we are trained as hard-nosed 
rationalist philosophers, or no-nonsense business executives, or data-driven 
scientists, research has shown that our decisions are influenced by various 
institutional practices.  The examples are too numerous to mention, but they 
include the spatial arrangement of supermarkets, the architectural design of 
churches, the rules of evidence and the structure of allowable questions in a 
courtroom trial, and a variety of rituals and practices designed to manipulate our 
emotions (see, e.g., Slavic’s experiments, discussed above).  Sometimes the 
effects are unintentional and are accidental features of the institutional 
environment; sometimes they are the result of strategic planning.   
The institutional practice of charities that specifies use of a successful 
presentation style may be an obvious and relatively innocuous example of how 
different media enter into the cognitive process, and how institutions may use 
media to elicit certain behavior.  I take this to be a case of socially extended 
cognition because the process of decision making changes, indeed is manipulated, 
when one set of external factors is introduced rather than another – that is, when 
images plus narrative are part of the process rather than statistical data – and the 
whole process is mediated by a certain institutional practice. From the perspective 
of critical theory, whether such processes have merely a causal effect on the 
decisions and behaviors of an audience, or are constitutive of cognition for the 
strategists, is less important than the outcome – which in either case is to lead our 
cognitive processes in a certain direction. 
The objective of the charitable organization that exploits these means for 
raising money may be noble, and the outcome, a certain amount of altruistic 
behavior, may be good for everyone, but one can easily think of other 
organizations, objectives, and outcomes that may not be so innocuous.  The point 
is, however, faced with such institutional practices, we not only ought to 
understand, from an efficiency perspective, how precisely they improve (or 
impede, or distort) cognitive processes of decision making or problem solving, or 
how we can improve their efficiency – these seem to be questions already 
addressed by various studies in cognitive science – but also, from a critical 
perspective, whether these processes improve (or impede, or distort) our 
communicative practices, our possibilities for action, our recognition of others, 
our shared and circumscribed freedoms, and so forth.  
One might think, however, that critical theory already does this sort of 
thing in its projects of cultural critique.  I don’t dispute this.  What I suggest is 
twofold.  First, that the concept of the extended mind, if we can get it right, offers 
a new understanding of what cognition (the mind) actually is and how it works.  
As such it offers a new perspective for understanding decision making, judging, 
problem solving, communicative practices, and so forth, which importantly 
includes reference to the kind of externalities that critical theory ought to be 
concerned about – institutional practices and procedures, norms, rules, 
technologies, and so forth.   Such externalities not only shape our cognitive 
processes and thinking, but also play a dominating role in bureaucratic systems, 
democratic processes, and an extensive range of social, legal, and political 
phenomena.  Accordingly the idea of the socially extended mind at the very least 
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offers a new tool for the practice of critical theory.  Second, although cognitive 
science is already studying the kind of cognition that some theorists take to be 
socially extended cognition, the proposal here is that we give this kind of 
cognitive science a critical twist.  
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